

9

Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency

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Reader's Guide

Western democracies have had difficulty responding to the new reality of global violent extremist terrorism. Two themes run through the long history of irregular warfare. The first is that all types of irregular warfare, including terrorism and insurgency, are appealing to those who seek to change the status quo, but what role can politics possibly play for those who are willing to kill themselves and others for rewards in the afterlife? For reasons that will become clear in this chapter, global violent extremists share much in common with their historical antecedents. The second theme is that conducting irregular warfare successfully to achieve change is a very challenging undertaking. Historically the balance sheet favours those who fight against terrorist and insurgent groups. For dissatisfied groups and individuals, however, irregular warfare will be used as it offers the promise of change to right perceived injustices and wrongs. Irregular warfare is often the only practical method of violence that weaker elements can use to wear down, coerce, or destroy their opponents to gain political power.

Introduction

At the height of the period in irregular warfare known as the ‘wars of national liberation’ (1962–65), journalist Robert Taber, who had spent time in Cuba during the revolution there, said:

“ The guerrilla fighter’s war is political and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose almost entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: *Guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict.* ”

Emphasis in original; Taber (1972: 26)

More recent critiques suggest identity or culture explain substate violence; conflict today is, as General Rupert Smith suggests, ‘war amongst the people’ instead. In addition, the technologies associated with globalization, including the Internet, are reshaping politics and violence.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the spirit of Clausewitz is still very much relevant to current and future terrorist and irregular campaigns. Historical experience cannot be summarily dismissed. Religious, social, cultural, and economic factors provide the context which shapes the conduct of irregular conflicts. Terrorists and insurgents, however, ultimately seek to achieve a *political* result from their use of force. These political results in turn serve goals defined by states fighting insurgencies or those aspiring to change the system through armed conflict.

Such motives are discernable even in the case of al-Qaeda and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The very nature of the extremist interpretation of Islam impedes Western understanding of the violence. As Johannes Jansen points out ‘Islamic fundamentalism is both fully politics and fully religion’ (Jansen 1997: 1). For Westerners, the affairs of the church and those of the state are separable, while within the militant Salafist strain of Islam they are not: indeed adherence to religious tenets becomes a form of governance. While religion justifies killing and suggests spiritual rewards, leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri stress political power and control:

“ Victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world, specifically in the Levant, Egypt, and the neighboring states of the Peninsula and Iraq. ”

al-Zawahiri (2005: 2)

From this established political base, the revolution can continue to spread.

Definitions

The first problem associated with the study of terrorism and irregular warfare relates to the relative and subjective lenses that one applies to the subject. One cannot simply compare accidental death figures, such as those from traffic fatalities, with purposeful violence

intended to spread fear among the populous. Critics suggest that the Department of Homeland Security's 2009 budget of US\$40.7 billion dollars far exceeds the nature and scope of the threat. Much of the confusion associated with terrorism and irregular warfare stems from the use of either value-laden or emotive language. The term 'freedom fighter' suggests heroism while 'terrorist' conveys cowardice. The term 'guerrilla' still evokes the romance and adventure of rebellion embodied by the iconic Ernesto 'Che' Guevara. There is also little agreement on what to call these types of violence: political violence, terrorism, irregular warfare, military operations other than war (MOOTW), low-intensity conflict (LIC), people's war, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, hybrid warfare, among others. Terrorism and insurgency are still viewed at best as a nuisance by many military professionals, or a form of 'dirty war' at worst. The line between combatants and non-combatants is unclear, objectives unclear, and the timeline for victory unknown. In addition, military forces conduct policing functions in this environment, with all of the dangers but little glory.

Irregular warfare, which is different in form but warfare nonetheless, describes types of violence conducted by sub-state actors including terrorism and insurgency.

Terrorism is easily the most contentious and elusive type of violence to define. For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as

“ the sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response. ”

Terrorism cannot result in change on its own. By provoking a response, terrorists hope that their opponent will overreact and reveal their true nature. Some debate exists over whether terrorism is a tactic within a broader strategy of insurgency or whether groups can conduct a strategy of terrorism (O'Neill 1990: 24). What separates terrorism from other forms of violence is that the acts committed are legitimized to a degree by their political nature. Hijacking, remote bombing, and assassination are criminal acts but the legal status of those who conduct them can change if the violence is carried out for a recognized political cause. Two examples illustrate the point. The

BOX 9.1

T. E. Lawrence on Irregular Warfare

Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as 'Lawrence of Arabia', explained the essence of irregular warfare:

In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and in them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

Lawrence, T. E. (1920) 'The Evolution of a Revolt', *The Army Quarterly*, 1(1), 69.

bombings conducted by anarchists against monarchs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are considered acts of terrorism given their stated objective of changing the political environment. The ‘pizza bomber’ case in Erie, Pennsylvania (2004), in contrast, was criminal in that the motivation behind it was financial gain. Problems exist in determining *who* recognizes the cause, beyond the terrorists themselves, as well as shifts in motive over time. Terrorists seek attention for their cause to generate domestic and international empathy for the plight that ‘drove’ the terrorists to arms.

Defining insurgency is equally problematic. Insurgency is perhaps best understood by first considering what it is not. Insurgency is not conventional war or terrorism, for example, but it shares with them the use of force to achieve a political end. The crucial difference is the scope and scale of the violence. Terrorism rarely results in political change on its own while insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms. The principal difference between irregular and conventional war is relatively simple: the latter involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment, training, and doctrine. In an insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetric and the weaker, and almost always a sub-state group attempts to bring about political change by administering and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe through the use of guerrilla tactics. These tactics are characterized by hit-and-run raids and ambushes against local security forces. Confusion often results from insurgent movements using terrorist tactics to achieve local results. Insurgency, unlike terrorism, is characterized by the support and mobilization of a significant proportion of the population. Individual insurgencies differ widely in terms of character (social, cultural, and economic aspects) and type (revolutionary, partisan, guerrilla, liberation, or civil war) but obtaining power and political control is the desired outcome. Finally, external physical and moral support for an insurgent cause is a prerequisite for success.

Definitions are not the final word on a subject but merely act as gateways. Capricious categorizations can lead to a misleading and seemingly irreconcilable divide between forms of irregular conflict. Terrorism and other forms of irregular warfare are plainly not the same activity, but how does one then classify the so-called ‘urban guerrilla’ phenomenon and its ideological impact on terrorist groups during the 1960s? In addition, some terrorist groups adopt parallel efforts that are more commonly associated with insurgencies—have they now become insurgents, do they remain terrorists, or have they become something else? The Lebanese organization known as Hezbollah has used terrorist tactics (kidnappings and suicide bombings), it fought both long and short guerrilla campaigns against Israeli forces (1983–2001 and 2006), but it also has provided social welfare to local communities, even if funded by Syria, Iran, and illicit commercial operations. Ultimately, some arbitrary distinctions must be made in order to grasp the business at hand, without losing perspective on the numerous grey areas endemic to this and other areas of strategic studies.

Subverting the System: The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare

Those undertaking insurgency and terrorism are trying to find a way to use their strengths, such as mobility, organization, and relative anonymity or stealth, against the weaknesses of their more powerful adversary. Bernard Fall reduced this equation even further in suggesting that ‘when a country is being subverted, it is being out-administered, not out-fought’ (Fall 1998: 55). However, subversion is a time-consuming and resource-intensive activity that does not guarantee success. In almost every case, the length of terrorist and irregular warfare campaigns is measured in *decades*, not years. They achieve success by gaining an advantage over their adversaries in terms of time, space, legitimacy, and/or support.

These dimensions of conflict are not mutually exclusive and excellence in one dimension will not compensate for drastic shortcomings in the others. Regardless of the space and time available, for example, a terrorist or insurgent campaign will almost always fail if it cannot attract substantial internal or international support. As in all forms of strategy, insurgencies or terrorist campaigns are dialectical struggles between competing adversaries; outcomes are determined by the interaction between opponents (Gray 1999a: 23–5). The goal for the irregular leader is to pit the organization’s strengths against enemy weaknesses. The value ascribed by different writers to and perceived relationships between time, space, legitimacy, and support create substantial variations in the theories of irregular warfare. These theories often reflect circumstances that are unique to specific conflicts, a fact that has contributed to failed government efforts to stop insurgents or terrorists. The unconsidered application of a theory based on a specific context to another conflict can lead to disaster.

Time

Time is the most important element required for the successful conclusion of an insurgent and terrorist campaign as it is a commodity that can be exchanged to make up for other weakness. With sufficient time, an insurgent group can organize, sap the resolve of its adversary, and build a conventional force capable of seizing control of the state. Mao organized time in his writings into three interrelated phases: the strategic defensive, the stalemate, and the strategic offensive.

Each phase, carefully conducted, would lead one step closer to victory no matter how long it eventually takes. Mao once stated, for example (Katzenbach and Hanrahan 1962: 139), that his forces had ‘retreated in space but advanced in time’. He understood that the sequence of phases leading to victory was not necessarily linear; unforeseen circumstances could lead to setbacks and perhaps regression to a previous phase of the insurgency. Endless struggle without an obvious victory would eventually lead to the exhaustion, collapse, or withdrawal of the enemy. The dimension of space works with time, providing insurgents with the leeway to manoeuvre, and demonstrates their superior legitimacy to the population. Perceived legitimacy in turn will generate internal and external support for the insurgents. With popular support, insurgents will be able to raise a superior army, launch bolder attacks, and achieve victory.

BOX 9.2**Mao's Three Stages of Insurgency**

Stage I, Strategic Defensive: This phase is characterized by avoidance at all costs of pitched, set-piece battles. Tactical offensives, with local numerical superiority, are carried out to further stretch enemy resources. The moral superiority of the guerrillas is established with the local population, political indoctrination is carried out and new recruits are trained to fight as irregulars in remote, safe bases.

Stage II, Stalemate: This phase begins the prolonged battle to attrit the enemy's physical and moral strength. Government control, in the form of local officials, is targeted and its representatives killed or forced to leave. With government presence in rural areas neutralized, the population can be drawn upon for moral and physical support. That support must be channelled into building capable, conventional 'main' forces.

Stage III, Strategic Offensive: The end game of the conflict, in which popular and main forces conduct the battle of maneuver and use overwhelming force destroy decimated enemy forces in their defensive positions.

Tse-Tung, Mao (1966) *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press), 210–19

Many irregular campaigns result in deadlock after a period of time with neither side able to decisively conclude the conflict. The insurgency waged by the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) for political autonomy within Sri Lanka remains unresolved after 35 years. Only very rarely does guerrilla struggle end quickly. The most famous quick insurgent success is the Cuban revolution (1957–9). Led by Fidel Castro, this irregular war was concluded in just three years. A number of factors contributed to the rapid collapse of the government forces; in the vast majority of cases, however, few states are as corrupt, inept, and fragile as the Batista regime in the late 1960s.

Such brittle adversaries are rare, but local circumstances can convince insurgents or terrorists that time works against them. Carlos Marighella believed that circumstances in Brazil in the 1960s demanded a response other than organizing and waiting for the right revolutionary conditions. Marighella favoured immediate action as he believed the state grew stronger every month while the Brazilian Communist Party did little but talk. By taking action, Marighella believed that the 'urban guerrillas' would build a critical mass for the guerrilla organization, catch the Brazilian state authorities off-guard, and provoke an extreme response. In other words, Marighella believed that the state of affairs within Brazil called for reversing the typical relationship between the guerrilla and time.

Space

Space allows irregulars to decide where and when to fight. If their adversary appears in overwhelming numbers, irregulars can make use of space to withdraw and fight when the odds are in their favour. Defenders against sedition cannot be everywhere at once without spreading their forces too thinly and inviting attack from locally superior guerrilla forces.

The exploitation of formidable terrain that limits the manoeuvre of government forces is a potent way in which lightly armed and mobile terrorists or insurgents offset their relative weaknesses in technology, organization, and numbers. Insurgents have often used difficult terrain for tactical advantage, often against foes ill-equipped to deal with the challenges presented by mountains, jungle, swamps, and even deserts. For example, Afghan Mujahaddin guerrillas used mountainous terrain to ambush predominantly road-bound Soviet forces, just as their forefathers did against the British. Triple-canopy jungle limited US and South Vietnamese attempts to apply overwhelming manoeuvre and firepower against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces. Urban terrain can also be an arduous obstacle, as the Russians found in 1994. Chechen guerrillas used buildings and narrow roads to offset their weakness and isolate and destroy Soviet formations during the battle for Grozny and Iraqi insurgents tried to do the same in Fallujah a decade later. Terrain difficult for government forces provides insurgent forces with the opportunity to establish safe areas or bases from which to expand the struggle.

Force-to-space ratios also influence the course and duration of insurgencies. If much territory needs to be defended by a government, terrorists or insurgents can compensate for their operational or strategic inferiority by massing forces locally to achieve tactical superiority. Government forces often attempt to defend territory or resources that have political, economic, social, and/or military value. For example, governments under siege often abandon the countryside in favour of more defensible cities and military bases. More often than not, states have the resources to protect many, but not every local target as their resources are stretched. Col. T. E. Lawrence, for instance, used the Arab force-to-space ratio advantage against the Turks to good effect during the Arab Revolt (1916–18). Given the amount of terrain to be covered, Lawrence calculated that the Turks would need 600,000 troops to prevent ‘sedition putting up her head’ across the entirety of the Transjordan, a figure six times larger than the forces available to the Turks (Lawrence 1920: 60). One of the most persistent criticisms against US and coalition leaders in defeating insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq is the lack of enough forces, including competent Iraqi and Afghan ones, for the space of each country.

Force-to-space ratio superiority does not require irregulars to operate over a huge geographic area in order to be successful. In the case of the guerrilla campaign conducted against the British in Cyprus, the nationalist group EOKA was limited to a space little more than 3 per cent of that roamed by Lawrence’s forces. EOKA’s leader, George Grivas-Dighenis, based his strategy on the assumption that substantial numbers of British troops would attempt to put down the insurgency. EOKA members operated in small groups and conducted ambushes, bombings, and assassinations. These actions convinced the British that the benefits of remaining in Cyprus were not worth the political and military price to be paid.

Support

Few insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without some form of support. In addition to munitions, insurgents must also look after casualties and continually replenish their supplies, including food and water. In addition, they must constantly update their intelligence on the whereabouts and activities of government forces as well as train new

recruits. Support, however, is interlinked with and inseparable from the legitimacy of the organization. Violence conducted without a comprehensible political purpose will generate little popular support. Without support, insurgents and terrorists will eventually succumb to the efforts of the state. Clausewitz suggested that support, in the form of public opinion, was one of the centres of gravity in a popular uprising (Clausewitz 1993: 720).

Insurgents and terrorists can look for support from both domestic (internal) and international (external) sympathizers. Almost all theorists agree that substantial popular support is required to compensate for the resources available to the state. Even Carlos Marighella, who believed initially that urban guerrillas could find and seize the necessary resources in major towns and cities to sustain the struggle, eventually relented and recognized the need to cultivate rural popular support. Domestic support can be forced from the population, using terror and intimidation, but long revolutionary struggles should not rely exclusively on such measures.

Although it is now a cliché, Mao's analogy describing the relationship between the guerrilla and the people is still evocative. The guerrillas were likened to 'fish' that swim in a 'sea' of popular support: without the sea, the fish will die. A dramatic example of the consequences of failing to secure domestic support is the fate of Che Guevara, who believed that conditions in Bolivia in 1967 were ripe for a guerrilla insurrection led by his *foco*.

He overestimated, however, the amount of support he could receive from local communists and farmers in Bolivia. The Bolivian communists were hostile to advice on how to run their revolution from outsiders. More importantly, the local peasants were indifferent to the message preached by Guevara given government-sponsored land reform initiatives that addressed some of their grievances. Guevara and his *foco* lacked popular support; the insurgents were either killed or captured within seven months of the first shots being fired.

Support is also contingent on the circumstances within a specific country. A danger exists in trying to reproduce success elsewhere using a previously effective revolutionary formula without first identifying the specific base of potential popular support. The uprising of the urban proletariat was considered a necessity in Marxist–Leninist revolutionary theory but failed dismally when attempted in China (1930) and Vietnam (1968). The agrarian character of China and Vietnam doomed urban revolts to failure; in both states

BOX 9.3

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and the Theory of the *Foco*

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara de la Serna Rosario (1928–1967) developed (and Régis Debray expanded on) the idea of *foco* or the centre of gravity of the guerrilla movement. Practically, the *foco* refers to the initial critical mass of the guerrillas, the vanguard of the revolution, from which all else is derived. Philosophically, the *foco* represents the political and military 'heart' of the insurgency and from it Guevara and Debray believed that *the guerrilla movement itself* can generate the conditions for a revolutionary victory (the title of a book by Debray reflects this shift: *The Revolution in The Revolution*). They believed that guerrilla success will eventually inspire local peasants to come to support them, allowing the organization to grow in strength.

most of the rural population were peasants. As a result, Mao Tse-Tung and Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap respectively modified their strategies and eventually succeeded.

External support for irregulars largely depends on both the geography of the country and the political relations maintained by the insurgents or terrorists. Such support can be material, in the form of resources or cross-border sanctuaries, or moral, in the case of political recognition and lobbying. Many Marxist terrorist groups during the 1970s, such as the German Rote Armee Faktion, received physical support from the Soviet Union or its client states. Tangible support included money, advanced weapons, and training. Insurgent and terrorist leaders in countries ranging from the Dutch East Indies (1950, later becoming Indonesia) and British Palestine (1948, later becoming Israel) received external support, as part of a backlash against colonialism, that tipped the balance in their favour. States harbour or support terrorist or insurgent groups for reasons of political expediency and to suit their own policy objectives rather than genuine sympathy for the cause such groups espouse. The ruling authorities in Jordan and Afghanistan made decisions regarding the relative political cost of providing sanctuary for their respective 'guests': the Palestinians in Jordan (1970) and Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda under Taliban protection in Afghanistan (2001). In addition, irregulars can serve to fight proxy wars against their patron's rivals. For example, Iran and Iraq sponsored rival terrorist groups designed to conduct attacks below the threshold of conventional war. With the regime of Saddam Hussein deposed, Iran continues to provide support and sanctuary for terrorist groups operating against coalition and Iraqi forces until their specific policy goals, namely a regime amenable to Iranian influence, are met.

Legitimacy

Insurgents and terrorists fighting irregular wars require internal or external support to sustain their struggle. Terrorists and insurgent leaders need to convey the reason for their actions or lose sympathy for its cause. They often seek to legitimize their use of violence and translate this into meaningful support for their cause by demonstrating moral superiority over those who represent the state, supplanting the functions of the state at the local level, and spreading a persuasive message.

The moral superiority of the guerrillas is a cornerstone of all irregular and terrorist theory, especially those fuelled by religious zeal. Insurgents derive support from the people and they often cultivate their relationship with them. Mao went so far as to outline a 'code of conduct' for the guerrillas, known as 'The Three Rules and Eight Remarks', as a way to demonstrate their moral superiority. The most important job of the guerrilla is to demonstrate this moral superiority in routine contact so that people differentiate the guerrillas from bandits or 'counter-revolutionaries'. Che Guevara insisted that the peasants understand that the guerrillas were as much social reformers as they were protectors of the people.

Peasants who cooperate with the insurgents often face harsh retaliation from the government but frequently this only further legitimizes the revolutionary cause. Abdul Haris Nasution, who fought against the Dutch in Indonesia from 1945–1949, suggested that government responses to subversion only served to drive the people further into the arms of the insurgents. Government brutality also allows insurgents to act as the avengers of the

BOX 9.4**Mao's 'Three Rules and Eight Remarks'****Rules**

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.*
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

*The translator to this edition, retired US Marine Corps Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffiths, notes that 'In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds.'

Tse-Tung (1961: 92)

people, helping to cement the ties between them. Carlos Marighella, for example, hoped that the actions of the Brazilian authorities would demonstrate conclusively that

“ [the] government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and that it resorts simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the 'gorillas' appear more and more to be the ones responsible for violence, while the lives of the people grow worse. ”

Marighella (1969)

Of course, the admonitions to behave better than government troops often are applied only to those who actively assist insurgents in their struggle. In a number of irregular conflicts, guerrillas and government forces alike regarded an unwillingness to help with aiding and abetting the enemy. Absolute popular support can never be guaranteed. Populations invariably split into willing assistants, staunch foes, and the undecided majority. To help make up the minds of those undecided, insurgents can demonstrate legitimacy by becoming the de facto government in areas under their control. This can include taking 'positive measures' such as the establishment of schools and clinics, or 'negative measures' such as tax collection. The use of terror as a negative measure to intimidate the population is a

BOX 9.5**Popular Support and Negative Measures in the Jihad in Iraq**

The following correspondence between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which was intercepted and translated in October 2005, suggests senior al-Qaeda leadership are keenly aware of the importance of popular support:

“ And it's very important that you allow me to elaborate a little here on this issue of popular support . . . If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad against the apostate rulers and their removal, then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support, even if the Jihadist movement pursues the method of sudden overthrow . . . In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful . . . Therefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve . . . meaning we must not throw the masses—scant in knowledge—into the sea before we teach them to swim. ”

al-Zawahiri, A. (2005) 'Letter from al-Zawahiri to Zarqawi', translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service

matter of debate by irregular warfare practitioners to this day. For Che Guevara, terror tactics were unjustified because they invariably delegitimize the guerrilla's message. Both Mao and Marighella disagree, noting that acts of terror may be necessary to convince the population of the occupational hazards of working for the government, or to provoke a repressive response. Negative measures backed by proselytizing can be an effective way of legitimizing the insurgent cause by showing conclusively that the government can no longer protect them. Intercepted communications between al-Qaeda leaders suggest that negative measures remain a concern for insurgents and terrorists today by affecting their other short- and long-term goals.

The most powerful method of legitimizing a struggle is to link military operations with a justifiable political end. Causes vary, but self-determination has been the most pervasive and successful rallying cry. Given the fundamental rights outlined in the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the United Nations Charter (1945), it was difficult for nations such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal to maintain possession of overseas colonies in the face of native insurgencies claiming the right of self-governance. Likewise the legitimacy of the East Timorese claim of independence led to internal and external pressure on the Indonesian government to end a 25-year insurgency. Other successful causes blend social, cultural, and economic issues into a powerful political message that the government or an international audience find difficult to counter or resist.

KEY POINTS

- Terrorism and insurgencies can be examined in terms of time, space, legitimacy, or support, reflecting specific local contexts rather than predetermined goals attributed to a general theory.
- Time is an important element in the success of insurgencies, involving a non-linear progression that includes the space to manoeuvre and to gain legitimacy and/or support, all of which are necessary for eventual victory.
- Terrain is important to offset weaknesses and gain tactical advantages, including gaining ‘force-to-space’ superiority at the time and place of your choosing.
- Support is dependent on legitimacy; it is derived internally from the quality of the interaction with the local populace and externally via resources from allies and sympathizers.
- Moral justification provides the cornerstone to sustain the struggle, usually blending cultural and social causes with political ends.

Protecting the System: Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism in Theory and Practice

The difficulties facing governments besieged by insurgents or terrorists may seem insurmountable at first glance, but numerous works have been written to explain how to quell them. This literature ranges from general theories and practical suggestions, based on hard-won experience, to complicated empirical models purporting to predict outcomes or test practical advice. Commentators have reduced complicated political–military struggles against forceful usurpers to a number of principles or formulas for success (see Box 9.6). Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith suggested in 1961 that antiguerrilla operations could be summed up in three words: location, isolation, and eradication (Mao Tse-Tung 1961: 32). Griffith’s summary is a useful reference point for exploring how to apply the strengths of a state (or group of states) against an irregular threat.

BOX 9.6

Principles, Prerequisites, and Laws of Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism

Material quoted from specific texts in chronological order.

Charles W. Gwynn: *Principles from Imperial Policing* (1934)

- Policy remains vested in civil government
- Minimum use of force
- Firm and timely action
- Cooperation between civil and military authorities.

David Galula: Laws of counter-insurgency from *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (1964)

- Support of the population necessary
- Support gained through an active minority
- Support from population is conditional
- Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.

Robert Thompson: Principles of counterinsurgency from *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966)

- Clear political aim
- The government must function in accordance with the law
- The government must have an overall plan
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas
- The government must secure its base areas first (in the guerrilla phase).

Frank Kitson: Framework for an effective counter-insurgency campaign from *Bunch of Five* (1977)

- Good coordinating machinery (between civil and military agencies)
- Establishing the sort of political atmosphere within which government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success
- Intelligence (right information = sensible policy)
- Law (upholding the rule of).

US Government: The long-term approach, building democracy and representative institutions, as well as the four priorities of action, from the ***National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House 2006)***

- Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism
- Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
- Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states
- Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and
- Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

This was one of the defining policy documents for the global war on terrorism. The strategy, which went through two editions, one in 2003 and one in 2006, owed its genesis to a student research project conducted at the National War College in Washington, DC. It is still available from a variety of sources but was removed from the White House website shortly after President Obama took office.

US Army/Marine Corps: Principles of counterinsurgency from FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Department of the Army 2007)

- Legitimacy is the main objective
- Unity of effort is essential

- Political factors are primary
- Counter-insurgents must understand the environment
- Intelligence drives operations
- Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support
- Security under the rule of law is essential
- Counter-insurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.

Location

The most important phase of any counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism campaign is recognizing that the threat exists. Counter-insurgency expert Robert Thompson believed it necessary to tackle an insurgency during its subversion and organization phase or at the first signs of a sustained campaign of violence (Thompson 1966: 50). In other words, he believed it necessary to defeat insurgents in both physical space *and* time. The problem for counter-insurgents and counter-terrorists is distinguishing between lawful or unlawful forms of discontent. Restricting guaranteed rights and freedoms every time a bomb is detonated will undermine the credibility and intentions of the government. Waiting too long to uphold the rule of law, however, will give the insurgents or terrorists the necessary time to build a robust organizational infrastructure that only the most dedicated efforts might hope to defeat.

Terrorism and insurgency can be staved off with enough early warning, but this implies that an effective intelligence-gathering and assessment organization is operating. Few states possess such resources or foresight. Those willing and able to destroy the system need to be identified and tracked: this requires the assistance of a supportive populace. The question in pluralist systems is whether or not *potentially* seditious individuals can be monitored or arrested without violating civil liberties and undermining the rule of law, as recent debates in Sweden, the United States, and Great Britain suggest.

Upholding the rule of law is crucial if states are to preserve the legitimacy of their cause and maintain the moral high ground over insurgents or terrorists. Methods to counter-terrorism, for example, must be effective yet stay within the boundary of the rule of law. This applies to both domestic and international measures. Citizens of democratic states are loath to give up rights and freedoms to combat threats especially if they intrude upon personal privacy. Managing how and when (and in what measure) to begin counter-insurgency and antiterrorism efforts, such as imposing curfews and controlling media access while upholding the rule of law, is the primary challenge to any government under siege. In most democratic societies, however, steps to counter terrorists rarely are preventative and almost always are taken *after* horrific acts of violence have been committed, as the Indian reaction to the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 suggest. Democracies run into greater trouble when their international actions appear to contravene its domestic laws and international norms. The vexing issues of al-Qaeda detainees and so-called ‘aggressive interrogation methods’ will not be resolved with a stroke of a presidential pen

but will continue to influence US counter-terrorism measures adversely until its credibility internationally is restored.

Once an irregular threat has been identified, various civil and military agencies must localize the threat while coordinating their response. They must identify safe houses, group members, and sources of supply. Gathering such information about the terrorists can be daunting, given the desire of most subversives to keep the organization small, stealthy, and secret. For a state providing direct counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism support into a geographically and culturally unfamiliar country, as the United States did in South Vietnam, obtaining even basic information on subversives takes time. This problem is compounded when a state either does not have an effective and efficient security apparatus (Afghanistan) or the existing one evaporates (Iraq). The time gained is used by insurgents to retain the initiative and develop their organizational base further.

Isolation

Isolating insurgents and terrorists from their bases of support is probably the most important element of successful campaigns against them. Isolation can take the form of physical separation or political alienation. Physical separation can be achieved by moving villagers into more easily defended compounds, known in Malaya and Vietnam as ‘strategic hamlets’, preventative measures such as curfews, prohibited no-go areas, food rationing, aggressive patrolling, and overt presence can also isolate insurgents physically. As with any form of deterrence, the threat posed by patrolling and presence must be a credible one and not consist simply of half-hearted ‘cordon and search’ operations. Isolation also means limiting the mobility and range of the insurgents or terrorists, in effect taking away their space and their time. Insurgents and terrorists also can be cut off from their external sources of support by a combination of diplomatic pressure and military measures. The French managed to block external support from reaching the Armée Liberation Nationale during the Algerian insurgency (1954–62): the border between Algeria and its neighbours Morocco and Tunisia was shut down by a combination of wire barriers, guardhouses, and patrols. Experts suggest that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be dealt with effectively until supply routes from neighbouring countries are cut off.

Segregating insurgents and terrorists from the population involves more than just physically separating them. To impose meaningful isolation, the state must defuse the irregular’s most powerful asset: its political message. Widely held grievances that foster a potent source of recruitment and support must be mitigated by the government. Obviously, some messages are more influential than others: self-determination is difficult to counter by an external or occupying power, whereas demands for land reform or increased political representation can be more easily satisfied. The words of the government must be accompanied by effective deeds to show that the state can and will respond to what amounts to political extortion. The terrorist or insurgents ‘propaganda of the deed’ must be diffused by government displays of a firm, yet lawful response. The displays can range from enforcing a ‘no negotiations with terrorists’ policy to simple measures like providing basic necessities and local security. The onus is on the representatives of the state to prove that they are *morally superior* to the guerrillas and terrorists and will provide for the needs of their

citizens, including responding to the sources of disgruntlement that led to armed insurrection in the first place. Likewise, the terrorist or insurgent cause must be discredited. Leniency also should be extended to those insurgents and terrorists who give up the armed struggle. Above all, citizens must be convinced that the state's fight is their fight. One of the keys to success in Iraq has been the so-called 'awakening' of the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, where a degree of local autonomy has been traded for turning against the local al-Qaeda-affiliated group. Popular support for the terrorists or insurgents must be denied through credible and efficient actions to win what Sir Gerald Templar called 'the hearts and minds' of the population. With little internal or external sustenance flowing to the rebels and a population willing to support the government, it is only a matter of time before the state's forces destroy the irregular threat.

Eradication

Eradication involves the physical destruction of the insurgents or terrorists, although few would go so far as to follow Robert Taber's rhetorical advice: 'There is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbors resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert' (Taber 1972: 11). The state has numerous advantages over its opponents given its control over social, fiscal, and military resources. The most important question in democratic states is whether or not the leaders of the state can apply their resources effectively to extinguish the insurgent flame without alienating popular support for their own authority. Cultural context matters when determining a response. For example, the leaders of some European countries were hesitant to cast actions against al-Qaeda after September 2001 as a 'war' for cultural and political reasons based on their historical experience. Indeed many continued to see the phenomenon of violent extremist terrorism exclusively as a domestic law-enforcement issue within their sovereign borders, requiring civilian police or paramilitary forces, and not as a *global* problem that might require the use of military forces.

Regardless of the forces used, theory and doctrine is rife with plans that discuss the destruction of guerrillas. These plans range from French Marshal Lyautey's innocuous-sounding 'oil patch' method applied in Morocco in the first quarter of the twentieth century to the more sinister-sounding Nazi German 'spider's web' and 'partridge drive' tactics. All theorists agree that eliminating the insurgents' safe havens must be a priority. Numbers also make a difference. US counter-insurgency doctrine as stated in the *Army Field Manual*, which is a doctrine manual guiding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that was produced in response to the difficulties faced by US and coalition forces in dealing with the problem of contemporary insurgency, suggests that 20–25 personnel are required for every 1000 inhabitants (Department of the Army 2007: 23). Most theorists also assert that 'special forces' are also needed to defeat the irregulars at their own game. Some advocate the use of technologies not available to the insurgents, such as helicopters and remote sensors, to enhance the force-to-space balance between government and irregular forces and to achieve superior mobility.

There are also passive ways in which the state can subvert an insurgency and thereby diminish the number of guerrillas or terrorists. One such method combines psychological

warfare techniques, promises of amnesty (e.g. the *Chieu Hoi*, or ‘Open Arms’ programme used in South Vietnam), cash incentives, or land to convince insurgents and terrorists that their struggle is in vain. Other methods, such as those tried with mixed success in Yemen, attempt to rehabilitate terrorists and reintegrate them into society. Political and economic pressure can be placed on states or groups providing safe havens for terrorists and insurgents. Other passive measures include engaging in political dialogue with, and offering support for, moderates within an irregular organization, convincing them of the need to start talking and stop fighting.

Political will must underlie efforts to counter-terrorism and insurgency. The eradication of an irregular movement is a gradual process of attrition that requires a significant and consistent investment in time and resources. Rarely have national leaders been able to sustain the political will necessary to defeat insurgents or terrorists. Equally daunting is the fact that the underlying causes of discontent often resurface and the embers of insurgency are rekindled in a different form. For example, the government of the Philippines conducted a textbook campaign to ‘defeat’ a communist insurgency during the 1950s with inspired leadership and US assistance. Barely a decade later, another Marxist-inspired insurgency flared up. Today Philippine leaders continue to struggle against Marxist and Muslim separatist groups. Some commentators have suggested that terrorism and irregular warfare are analogous to the mythical hydra: cut off one head and several more appear in its place.

The effects of terrorism can be limited through a combination of offensive and defensive measures, but ultimately bringing terrorists to justice, especially for crimes beyond state borders, can be accomplished by a combination of the political will to sustain the struggle, maintaining core societal values and upholding norms, and making the best use of its capabilities. Bringing individuals to trial for actions below the threshold of ‘an act of war’ takes even greater reserves of time, patience, resolve, negotiation, and treasure. It took the United States 12 years and considerable third-party support, for example, to bring those allegedly responsible for the Lockerbie bombing to trial. In the end, the side that will prevail will be the one most willing to continue the struggle and make the least damaging choices throughout its course.

KEY POINTS

- Methods used by the state in response to local threats are aimed crucially at maintaining a lawful, hence political–moral, legitimacy.
- The eradication of insurgents is often a slow process and will take different forms in different political and cultural contexts.
- The strategy of state success is based on isolating the insurgents both physically and politically.

Irregular Warfare Now and in the Future

The supposition that terrorism and irregular warfare involve the use of force strictly for political ends has recently been challenged. As stated in the introduction, some suggest that irregular conflict is no longer about politics. In other words, wars of national liberation, ideological terrorism, and revolution have joined colonial small wars in the museum of ‘conflict past’. Instead, some suggest that contemporary and future irregular threats are driven by a mixture of culture, religious fanaticism, and technology.

Culture

Samuel Huntington famously argued in 1996 that future conflict on the macro level will result from differences in culture between incompatible civilizations. Others believe that on a micro level, substate warrior cultures will become the predominant irregular threat. Westerners fight wars according to established norms and modalities. States, which retain the monopoly on the use of force, go to war with one another to achieve political aims. Examples from Chechnya, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggest a new form of irregular warfare is emerging. In this ‘fourth generation warfare (4GW)’, networks of warriors will utilize their social and culture advantages to offset the technological advantages of Western soldiers (Hammes 2004). According to this argument, soldiers are no match for warriors. Proponents of this view suggest that the availability of modern small arms and disdain for Western rules of warfare give cultural warriors their military superiority. Political aims do not matter to Somali clansmen, high on *khat*, driving around Mogadishu in heavily armed civilian vehicles. Warrior culture dictates goals—honour, plunder, or manhood—instead of politics.

Other observers argue that in the future violence will be ethnic- or identity-based. The political basis for war, Clausewitz’s trinity of the people, the state, and the armed forces, is irrelevant. Where states cannot govern effectively, they cannot represent the will of the people. Without a state to sustain the armed forces, the only surviving element of Clausewitz’s trinity is the people who splinter into competing cultural and ethnic communities. The moral resolve of such cultural and social networks is superior precisely because they exist to fight. The conventional armed forces of developed nations will be increasingly irrelevant in the face of such superior will and approaches to warfare that offset technological advantages. The net effect is chaos and mayhem among substate groups with ‘state’ borders as the new norm for war.

Religious fanaticism

Religious beliefs often shape terrorists’ and insurgents’ causes and are used to obtain support among a community of the faithful. Throughout history, religion has been a powerful stimulus for political violence by Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sikhs, and other faiths. In exchange for personal sacrifice, earthly representatives of some faiths promise terrorist martyrs a glorious afterlife for conducting attacks, suicide or otherwise, that kill

non-believers. Religion does, however, provide insurgent and terrorist leaders with a number of advantages for their cause. First, leaders such as Osama bin Laden use religion to provide a competing value structure and ideology to rally the deprived and disillusioned behind their cause. What bin Laden and his followers offer is an alternative to the Western, materialist culture and an attempt to recapture previous glories of a mythic past. What has surprised Western analysts is the resonance that this vision has across cultural and ethnic lines—in other words, the degree of popular support for his message. Second, religion offers a rationale for action. Much like Che Guevara, Osama bin Laden and his followers see themselves as social reformers. Terrorist attacks serve to raise the consciousness of the global Islamic community (the *ummah*) to the existing struggle as well to demonstrate to others that there is an alternative to their current situation. Religion can also blind the faithful to certain realities. Religious-inspired terrorist movements often overestimate the appeal of their message. As with political ideologues, including Mao Tse-Tung, religious ideologues convince themselves that the future is predetermined based on the righteousness of their cause. Particularly heinous or indiscriminate actions over time may lead even the staunchest supporters, much less allies of convenience, to question the legitimacy and viability of religiously sanctioned terrorism. For example, some affiliated insurgent groups and external supporters of al-Qaeda in Iraq are distancing themselves from attacks that target or have killed large numbers of fellow Muslims as opposed to occupying coalition forces. The inability of Western democracies to influence a fundamentalist segment of Islamic population raises the spectre of an interminable war of annihilation of the type mentioned by Robert Taber above.

Technology

Weapons of mass destruction

The congruence of religion and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—including biological, chemical, radiological and even nuclear weapons—portends a frightful and very real ‘apocalypse now’. Modern religious fanatics do not have the political cause, and therefore restraint of their terrorist predecessors and may be interested just in killing as many non-believers as possible. Experts point to the ease with which chemical and biological agents, or ‘poor man’s atom bombs’, can be manufactured or acquired; the decreasing frequency but increasing lethality of terrorist acts; and the breaking of a so-called WMD taboo by Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo in 1995 and the mailing of anthrax spores to the US Congress in October 2001. Those who track terrorist attempts to acquire WMD suggest that the question is not ‘if’ such attacks will occur but rather ‘when’—and whether Western democracies will be able to manage the consequences.

Information technology

The Internet transcends borders, and therefore some observers believe that future irregular wars will be fought in cyberspace. Given the vulnerability of websites and servers to hackers, terrorists inevitably will become cyberterrorists through the World Wide Web. Serbian and Indonesian hacking of opponents’ websites, as well as the ‘defacing’ of al-Qaeda affiliated websites by groups such as TeAmZ USA, are examples interpreted by some as

evidence that cyberwar is a reality. Hacking and defacing provide glimpses into what ambitious cyberterrorists and activists can accomplish. Policy-makers fear that cyberterrorists and infosurgents will conduct electronic raids on vital national systems controlled by computers (e.g., financial services, transportation networks, and power grids). Fear is no longer based on the prospect of violence: information and the ability to control it has become the new form of power.

Whether or not terrorist and insurgent campaigns will be entirely ‘virtual’ is a matter of speculation. A technological reality is that access to the Web, satellite communications, and portable computers greatly enhance the capability of aspiring terrorists and insurgents. According to media reports, the group which rampaged through and besieged part of Mumbai in November 2008 made use of readily available cellular and satellite phones, as well as overhead imagery from Google Earth, to coordinate and plan their attack. Such technology and information was once the exclusive purview of major powers. Websites, portals, and weblogs allow the quick dissemination of propaganda, training materials, and ‘best practices’, while basic equipment such as a laptop, software, and a CD burner allows materials to be produced professionally and disseminated clandestinely. With a computer and connection to the Internet, an individual can do more damage than armed terrorist cells or small insurgent movements. More importantly, some senior al-Qaeda leaders view the future of the movement as a ‘leaderless resistance’ of compartmented, geographically dispersed cells. The net effect, observed in the Philippines, Iraq, and elsewhere, is that individuals or small insurgent cells can obtain training and mission planning materials, share information, and coordinate their activities with little fear of being caught by security forces.

KEY POINTS

- Religion is useful as a rallying point and enabler for terrorism but cannot provide a strategy to achieve the desired objectives.
- Culturally inspired insurgents might change the nature of uprisings from traditional ‘trinitarian’ wars to chaotic ethnic conflict.
- The replacement by religious fanatics of the political with ‘apocalyptic millenarianism’ possibly portends the lethal combination of martyrs with weapons of mass destruction.
- Information technologies and the World Wide Web have provided terrorists with new capabilities to reach across time and space, creating vulnerability in a state-based system where control of information equals power.

Conclusion

States will be plagued by terrorism and irregular warfare as long as individuals are willing to use violence for political purposes. The shocking cultural details of irregular conflicts, such as al-Qaeda’s recorded beheadings of captives and the use of starvation as a weapon in Sudan and Somalia, can obscure the political purpose behind the fighting. Terrorism

and irregular warfare have long been used to change political systems and acquire power; more recently, cultural schisms have led to a rise in terrorism carried out for religious and personal reasons.

Current re-evaluations of irregular warfare and terrorism often lack context. Religion, culture, ethnicity, and technology remain important elements of irregular warfare. They define how and why individuals take up arms against perceived injustices, but the *ultima ratio* for the use of irregular methods of war is to achieve *political* results. US militia and patriot groups, for instance, hope to provoke a response to redress the *political* imbalance between what they perceive as illegitimate federal authorities and individuals' rights and freedoms established in the Constitution. Terrorist use of WMD is a frightening prospect. Yet Shoko Asahara, the spiritual leader of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, only attempted to use chemical and biological agents *after* his political ambitions were thwarted in 1990. Revenge for his humiliation at the polls was perhaps the most significant reason for launching chemical and biological attacks. Likewise the stream of veiled threats of WMD use by al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, should draw attention to the fact that the movement has failed since 2001 to achieve its stated objective of creating a theocracy to undertake social reform.

Warrior cultures may appear to espouse violence for its own sake but at the root of their struggle is the quest for political autonomy, control, or power. The protracted guerrilla war fought by the Chechens against the Russians is little different from the one conducted in 1856: the Chechens' desire is to gain political autonomy from Moscow. Somali warlords seek to gain political power and influence for their clans. Native Americans fought against the US Army in the nineteenth century to maintain autonomy and protect their traditional hunting grounds. Even ancient irregulars, classified as *barbarii* by the Romans, were resisting attempts to have Pax Romana imposed upon them.

So is the trinity of Clausewitz no longer relevant? To suggest so misrepresents its foundation and misconstrues the reasons why irregulars fight in the first place. After all, primordial violence (the people) serves no purpose unless it is subordinated ultimately to policy (the government). Violence undertaken for personal gain, be it financial or to enhance one's reputation, is nothing more than a criminal act in civil society and should be treated as such.



QUESTIONS

1. What is the difference between terrorism and insurgency and why is it important to distinguish between them?
2. Does the nature or character of irregular warfare change—or do both?
3. Can terrorists and insurgents sacrifice the element of time to achieve political change and if so, under what conditions?
4. Why is the element of space easy to discuss in theory but difficult to incorporate in practice?
5. Why are irregular warfare theorists divided on the use of terror as a method of compelling support?

6. Is irregular war governed by the principles of war or does it have its own principles?
7. Why is there no universal theory of irregular warfare?
8. What did Bernard Fall mean when he said that subversives are out-administering their opponents? Why does he place so much emphasis on organization rather than fighting?
9. Why is locating terrorists and insurgents so difficult?
10. How is the balance struck between force and the rule of law on both sides of an irregular campaign?
11. How can those countering insurgents and terrorists win?
12. Has religion, culture and technology changed the nature of terrorism?



FURTHER READING

- **R. Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (London: Pelican, 1968).** This study, by a French philosopher, develops Che Guevara's concept of the *foco* more fully.
- **Department of the Army, *FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007).** Oft-cited but rarely read, this Army/Marine Corps document has achieved an unprecedented degree of fame for a doctrinal publication.
- **B. B. Fall, 'The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency,' *Naval War College Review*, 15/1 (1999), 46–57.** A good basic introduction to the core concepts of and relationship between insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- **C. Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 3rd edn (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997).** This is an updated version of Che Guevara's manual on guerrilla warfare based on his Cuban experience.
- **B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)** remains a useful analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism.
- **J. Jansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997)** is a source that offers numerous insights into the evolution of fundamentalist Islamic thought and its practice by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
- **D. Kilcullen, 'Countering Global Insurgency', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28/4 (August 2005), 597–617.** Argues that applying 'classic' principles of counterinsurgency in the contemporary context is ill-advised.
- **T. E. Lawrence, 'The Evolution of a Revolt', *The Army Quarterly*, 1/1 (1920), 55–69.** The article is a distilled account of the strategy used during the Arab Revolt that was embellished considerably when published as *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), pp. 188–96.
- **M. Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966)** is a collection of Mao's most important tracts that provides insights into the evolution of his military thought on irregular warfare.
- **C. Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (1969).** See <http://www.baader-meinhof.com/index.htm>. Although repetitive and tactical, this work was the handbook for Marxist terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s.

- **A. H. Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1965)** is a useful, if highly derivative, account of the practical problems associated with conducting both insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns—from an author with experience in both.
- **M. Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)** provides a social network analysis of al-Qaeda.
- **R. Taber, *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (London: Paladin, 1972)** is interesting for a variety of reasons, including demonstrating the dangers associated with getting too close to one's subject matter.
- **R. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966)** was the most influential work of its day as it provided counter-insurgency advice derived from the author's role in the successful Malayan campaign.
- **C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret (London: Everyman's Library, 1993).** This is a classic study of the relationship between politics and war.



WEB LINKS

- RAND Corporation http://www.rand.org/hot_topics/counterinsurgency. Although RAND offers numerous downloadable reports on all aspects of irregular warfare, its counter-insurgency section features contemporary analysis as well as a wealth of historical reports useful to the researcher.
- Baader-Meinhof <http://www.baader-meinhof.com/>. This site contains excellent information on the Baader-Meinhof group. It has a section for students and researchers.
- Combating Terrorism Center <http://www.ctc.usma.edu>. Founded in 2001, the CTC website provides access to a range of outstanding reports and products, based on declassified documents and other primary source research, that are available for download.
- *The Small Wars Journal* <http://smallwarsjournal.com> This portal offers access to the blog, journal, and professional reading lists posted by a range of practitioners, academicians, and subject matter experts.
- Marx to Mao Website <http://www.marx2mao.com>. Provides the full text of most of Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare as well as those of V. I. Lenin.
- The Counterterrorism Blog <http://counterterrorismblog.org>. Expanded from a blog to a portal, this website features expert commentary and cutting-edge coverage of recent terrorism trends and incidents. This site features a treasure trove of news items and documents but requires a level of familiarity with the subject.